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I. INTRODUCTION 
T HE first century of antitrust law in America has been turbulent and controversial. The history is well-known. An initial period of neglect followed the passage of the Sherman Act in 1890.1 En-
forcement efforts picked up during the Taft Presidency, and, aided by the 
Clayton Act in 1914,2 reached a peak with the early per se holding in 
Trenton Potteries.3 The Depression abruptly halted this trend, an effect 
especially noticeable in the extraordinary Appalachian Coals4 decision in 
1933. The halt proved only temporary, however, and by 1940 the per se 
rule had been reinstituted5-as it turned out-with a vengeance. 
After World War II, the Supreme Court expanded the horizons of anti-
trust in all directions. For a third of a century-from the Alcoa6 decision 
in 1945 to that in GTE Sylvania7 in 1977-the growth of antitrust en-
forcement , both public and private, never seemed to slow. Then, once 
again abruptly, Antitrust fell out of favor, a place where it has largely 
remained to this day. 
Many explanations can be offered for this checkered history. Political, 
economic, and judicial fashion all change as time passes and new dramatis 
personae enter the drama. Outside events clearly play a role-Appalach-
ian Coals only makes sense when placed in the context of the country's 
disillusionment with capitalism during the depths of the Depression.8 
Similarly, the marked reluctance to enforce many antitrust doctrines in 
the 1980s can be traced in part to concern over America's declining posi-
tion in the world marketplace. Strong Justices who feel passionately 
about Antitrust-Black, Douglas, Scalia-certainly matter. The attitude 
of the Executive Branch can be critical, as seen vividly in recent years by 
the refusal of the Reagan Justice Department to prosecute resale price 
maintenance violators. Antitrust also has certainly had its critics in the 
economics professorate, ranging from John Kenneth Galbraith and Les-
ter Thurow on the left to the Chicago School and libertarians on the 
right.9 
These influences are all extensively discussed in the literature. A factor 
that is rarely discussed, however, is the quality of the opinions issued by 
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 44 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
3. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927). 
4. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933). The decision ap-
proved an industry-wide coal cartel with wide authority to set prices, production quotas, 
and the like. 
5. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). 
6. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
7. Continental T.V. , Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). . 
8. As well as with the fascination with Italian-style corporatism found in the early 
years of the New Deal. See generally ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEw DEAL AND THE PRoB-
LEM OF MONOPOLY: A STUDY IN ECONOMIC AMBIVALENCE (1966). 
9. See Spencer W. Waller, The Modem Antitrust Relevance of Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
59 BROOK. L. REV. 1443 (1994). 
' • 
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the Supreme Court. This is somewhat surprising. Those opinions some-
times have been notably good;10 all too often, however, they have been 
awful.11 Worse, many have been intellectually dishonest.12 It is easy to 
believe that the quality of the explanation for a particular decision has 
had a significant, generally adverse, impact on the success of the doctrine 
the Court sought to establish.13 This paper examines the quality of some 
of these opinions, a measurement made by reference to the standards of 
jurisprudence developed by the Legal Process School.14 
Antitrust is best thought of as a massive delegation of authority to the 
federal courts to create a body of common law to interpret and develop 
over time the broad and quasi-constitutional language that Congress used 
in the Sherman Act and many later antitrust statutes. The Legal Process 
School provides a particularly powerful lens to use in viewing that body 
of common law adjudication. Looking at Antitrust through that lens, we 
suggest that specific rules of antitrust doctrine have "succeeded" when 
they have been the subject of reasoned elaboration by the Supreme 
Court, openly and fairly confronting the legal and policy questions before 
it, and creating a reasonably stable body of precedent that is accepted by 
both governmental institutions and private parties as a basis for planning 
and conducting economic behavior. Measured against this standard, we 
believe that the Supreme Court has enjoyed a few shining successes and a 
greater number of dismal failures. Those failures either led to continued 
warfare among the lower courts, the agencies, and the commentators or 
forced the government and private parties to find non-adjudicative ways 
to reach stable and predictable rules to guide market behavior. 
II. THE LEGAL PROCESS LENS 
This essay tests the hypothesis that the success of antitrust jurispru-
dence reflects its ability to realize Legal Process goals. "Success" is mea-
sured by several factors: coherence and stability of doctrine through 
reasoned elaboration by the Supreme Court; acceptance of that doctrine 
by lower courts, practitioners, and academics; and acceptance by other 
policymakers such as Congress and the Department of Justice. Because 
this is a speculative essay, w.e attempted to keep both it and the footnotes 
short and to the point. 
The essay begins with a short reminder of antitrust realities and a brief 
description of Legal Process decision-making. 
10. See, e.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897). 
11. See, e.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968). 
12. See, e.g., Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. CorjJ., 485 U.S. 717 (1988). 
13. Those opinions also have had a significant, adverse impact on many who read 
them. The senior author of this Article first became cynical about all Supreme Court opin-
ions while teaching Antitrust two decades ago. The cynicism has never left. 
14. See infra Part II.B for an explanation of Legal Process jurisprudence. 
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A . ANTITRUST REALITY 
The stakes involved in antitrust litigation are high.15 The federal gov-
ernment may bring either a civil or criminal action.16 A criminal charge 
may result in a felony conviction, a jail term, and/or a huge fineP A 
losing defendant also may face structural relief-dissolution, divestiture, 
general judicial interference in the company's business, or anything else a 
creative equity court may imagine.18 Worse, this interference may last for 
decades if the court decides to retain jurisdiction over compliance.19 
Private actions also may be brought under the antitrust law. Again, the 
stakes are high. A losing defendant must pay treble damages, as well as 
costs and attorneys' fees.20 Those damages may be proven with the re-
laxed causation and rigor associated with the proof of tort damages.21 
Liability is joint and several, with no right to contribution.22 Some cases 
can be brought as class actions, multiplying exposure many times. Limi-
tation periods are loosely enforced. A plaintiff may use a successful gov-
ernmental enforcement action as "prima facie" evidence of defendant's 
misconduct.23 Not only are the financial stakes high, but these incredibly 
complex cases are tried to a jury, a body which hardly can be expected to 
understand the complexities or be sympathetic to antitrust defendants. 
These harsh antitrust realities suggest that antitrust law works best 
when it is predictable and subject to decisions rendered as a matter of law 
rather than of fact. Predictability is important because antitrust concerns 
are often raised at the planning stage of business decisions. A decisional 
rule which requires an analysis of many factors of unknown weight does 
not reassure planners.24 The effect of lack of predictability, of course, is 
either to deter completely ventures which do not in fact raise serious anti-
trust concerns, or to raise the cost (by increasing the risks) for those 
which do go forward.25 
15. There is a large degree of overlapping jurisdiction in government enforcement. 
Both the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission have general jurisdic-
tion over Antitrust enforcement. Other federal regulatory agencies, such as the FCC, are 
expected to consider antitrust concerns in exercising their powers. Finally, the individual 
states may seek enforcement under either state or federal antitrust law. 
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2, 16 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
17. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (Supp. V 1993). 
18. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1988); see also §§ 4, 25. 
19. The defendant might have to spend decades seeking approval from a hostile judge. 
See, e.g., In re IBM, 45 F.3d 641 (2d Cir. 1995}. The court granted a mandamus requiring 
the recusal of the judge who had supervised the initial consent decree and in whose court 
the case had been since 1952. /d. at 645. 
20. 15 u.s.c. § 15 (1988). 
21. J. nuett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 566 (1981); Story 
Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562 (1931). 
22. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981). 
23. 15 u.s.c. § 5 (1988). 
24. See, e.g., United States v. Penn-Olin Chern. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 176-77 (1964) (list· 
ing 12 factors for the trial court to consider and balance on remand). 
25. neating antitrust issues as law rather than fact questions discourages "strike" 
suits-suits brought for their settlement value, but which have no intrinsic claim to merit. 
Questions of law, of course, are much more susceptible to resolution before trial, or, per-
haps, even before discovery. 
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This law must be judge-made. The language of the basic antitrust stat-
utes-the Sherman,26 Clayton,27 and Celler-Kefauver28 Acts- is general 
and unhelpful. Their legislative history, despite wishful efforts by Judge 
Bork to the contrary,29 provides even less help. For more than a century, 
antitrust legislation has been what the Supreme Court has said it is. 
B. LEGAL PROCESS 
Legal Process jurisprudence,30 briefly put, requires that a judge explain 
her decision. That explanation must refer to the societal goals that the 
judge seeks to achieve.31 The opinion should be honest and provide a 
basis for determining whether the rule laid down controls arguably simi-
lar fact situations. Precedent must be distinguished on the basis of ex-
pressed decisional standards. That which cannot be distinguished must be 
overruled. A Legal Process judge, in short, engages in what Hart and 
Sacks call "reasoned elaboration" -honest, that is to say forthright, ex-
planations of why the facts will lead to identified goals.32 
An opinion satisfying Legal Process standards does not have to estab-
lish a per se or otherwise easy to apply rule of decision. A proper opin-
ion, however, does have to fit the rule laid down within a policy analysis. 
When that is done, the opinion helps lawyers and judges decide on which 
side of the line the conduct falls. It also helps them determine whether 
the rule applies in analogous cases. As an example, consider the follow-
ing excerpt: 
The conduct of a single firm is governed by § 2 alone and is unlawful 
only when it threatens actual monopolization. It is not enough that a 
single firm appears to "restrain trade" unreasonably, for even a vig-
orous competitor may leave that impression. For instance, an effi-
cient firm may capture unsatisfied customers from an inefficient 
rival, whose own ability to compete may suffer as a result. This is the 
rule of the marketplace and is precisely the sort of competition that 
promotes the consumer interests that the Sherman Act aims to fos-
26. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
27. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 44 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
28. 15 u.s.c. § 18 (1988). 
29. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT -WAR WITH ITSELF 
{1978). 
30. Legal Process jurisprudence takes its name from HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT 
M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF 
LAw {1994). The publication date of the text is quite misleading. The manuscript began 
extensive circulation in the mid-1950s and reached its final "tentative" fonn, a lbeit still 
unpublished, in 1958. For four decades it circulated widely in manuscript fonn. Only last 
year was a printed version finally available. Despite the obvious difficulties caused by this 
history of non-publication, Tl-IE LEGAL PROCESS has been the most influential American 
legal treatise of the past half-century. For more on the history of Legal Process, see Wil-
liam M. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Introduction, to id. 
31. See generally WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, J UDICIAL PROCESS IN A NUTSHELL 55-65 
{2d ed. 1991) (explaining Legal Process analysis). A recent, sympathetic account of Legal 
Process can be found in Anthony J . Sebok, Misunderstanding Positivism, 93 MICH. L. REv. 
{forthcoming 1995): 
32. HART & SACKS, supra note 30, at 143. 
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ter. In part because it is sometimes difficult to distinguish robust 
competition from conduct with long-run anti-competitive effects, 
Congress authorized Sherman Act scrutiny of single firms only when 
they pose a danger of monopolization. Judging unilateral conduct in 
this manner reduces the risk that the antitrust laws will dampen the 
competitive zeal of a single aggressive entrepreneur.33 
By rooting that explanation in policy go·als, the Court has made it possi-
ble for lower courts and litigants to know whether to apply the Cop-
perweld test to arguably comparable situations.34 
"Good" antitrust law, from a Legal Process point of view, is law that is 
clear and easy to apply. It also should be acceptable to lower courts and 
enforcement agencies, so that they will not conduct guerrilla warfare to 
undermine an overly broad rule.3s Finally, it should reflect societal un-
derstanding of what constitutes desirable business behavior. The rest of 
this paper evaluates the success of the Supreme Court in achieving the 
Legal Process goals in its antitrust jurisprudence. 
III. ANTITRUST SUCCESSES AND FAILURES 
A. COMPLETE SUCCESS: HORIZONTAL PRICE FIXING 
The Court's most successful antitrust jurisprudence has been the per se 
rule against agreements among competitors which affect prices. The 
Court's decisions on horizontal price fixing for half a century have satis-
fied the criteria for successful decision-making. They have been doctri-
nally coherent, provided guidance, and have been widely accepted. 
This success does not stem from the Court's success in articulating the 
per se rule . Indeed, the opinion which established the per se rule did so 
in as obscure a fashion as possible.36 It comes in the middle of a long 
footnote dealing with venue, cites only to a treatise, and provides no pol-
icy justification.37 Although the Court eventually did identify policies 
served by the per se rule against horizontal price fixing, its early explana-
tions were neither sophisticated nor compelling. The great success of the 
per se rule must have some other source. 
Part of this success must come from the uncompromising nature of the 
rule, and the vigor, indeed relish, with which the Court has applied it for 
more than half of a century. The Court has left no room for doubt. The 
rule means what it says. 
33. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Thbe Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767-68 (1984) (cita-
tions omitted). 
34. See generally Stephen Calkins, Copperweld in the Courts: The Road to Caribe, 63 
ANTITRUST L.J. 345 (1995). This language apparently was cribbed from the Solicitor Gen-
eral's Brief. See id. at 369. It will surprise no Antitrust devotee to Jearn that one of the few 
satisfactory Supreme Court passages in this area did not originate with the Court. 
35. HART & SACKS, supra note 30, at 545-630. 
36. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). 
37. /d. at 224-26 n.59. 
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1. Doctrinal Coherence 
Antitrust claims generally are evaluated by a balancing test-in anti-
trust parlance, by a "rule of reason."38 Some practices, however, are so 
unlikely to be reasonable that the Court, for reasons of predictability and 
judicial economy, has condemned them out of hand. Such per se prac-
tices are "conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore 
illegal. . . . " 39 
The per se rule applied to horizontal price-fixing cases has been ex-
tremely successful, and has been re-affirmed by the Court many times 
over the years. It is easy to see why this is so. The per se rule is easy to 
understand and easy to apply. Even its exceptions make sense and fit 
easily within the harmony of the rule.40 As is always true in the law, 
there are boundary problems and some horizontal restraints have been 
held not to be subject to the per se rule. 
The Supreme Court has held in a series of cases that some horizontal 
arrangements affecting price are not so inevitably anticompetitive that 
they should be condemned asperse unreasonable.41 Commentators who 
read these cases as the heralding of the demise of per se rules42 generally 
make two mistakes. First, as a matter of statutory construction of the 
Sherman Act, restraints of trade are unlawful only if they "unreasonably" 
restrain trade.43 Under the rule of reason, agreements only are per se 
unreasonable where they are manifestly anticompetitive and lack any 
plausible procompetitive benefits for society. Otherwise, they must be 
tested under the traditional rule of reason and upheld unless on balance 
the agreement unreasonably restrains competition. The practices that the 
Court considered in the 1970s and 1980s could not be condemned out-
right as per se unreasonable either because the Court was not sufficiently 
familiar with the competitive effects of the practice in question or because 
the agreement appeared to have a significant procompetitive potential. 
Rather than forcing every potential agreement into a price-fixing or 
not price-fixing label with outcome determinative consequences, the 
Court has in fact injected some analytical content into the rule of reason. 
The Court has no intention of abandoning the use of per se rules for 
practices with no apparent pro-competitive potential.44 More important, 
38. This test was first announced in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 66 
(1 911). 
39. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). 
40. There is some minor academic quibbling, of course. See, e.g., STEPHEN F. Ross, 
PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST LAW 134-43 (1993) {discussing standard of legality to be applied 
in non-per se cases). 
41. NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 103 (1984); Broad-
cast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United 
States, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978). 
42. See, e.g. , Ross, supra note 40, at 134-43. 
43. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 58-60. 
44. See Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46,49-50 (1990) (per curiam) (horizontal 
division of territories still _per se unreasonable); FTC v. Superior Ct. lfial Lawyers Ass'n , 
493 U.S. 411, 436 (1990) (price-fixing scheme implemented through group boycott per se 
unreasonable); Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 650 (1980). 
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regardless of what label the Court uses, it has been finn and clear in strik-
ing down agreements between competitors without much ado whenever it 
appears that the procompetitive upside of the arrangement is nil.45 As 
Justice Stevens has observed: "The essential point is that the rule of rea-
son can sometimes be applied in the twinkling of an eye. "46 
But the Court has always been careful to make it quite clear that 
whatever the scope of the exceptions to the per se rule, no room exists for 
the belief that a defendant can question the basic application of the per se 
rule to run-of-the-mill price-fixing conspiracies.47 The Court also will not 
permit defendants to question the fundamental congressional belief that 
competition rather than collusion is society's strongly preferred method 
of interaction among competitors.48 
Agreement in the Court regarding the wisdom of the per se rule, ex-
tending over a long period of time, makes it much less likely that a liti-
gant will seek to attack or undermine the rule .49 Even when a particular 
application of the doctrine has been problematic and powerfully attacked 
by prominent critics, the Court steadfastly has resisted watering down the 
basic rule of prohibition. The obvious example is horizontal, maximum-
price-fixing where the Court has stuck to its per se guns.50 
2. Substantial Merit 
More of the success can be traced to the basic soundness of the per se 
rule. No one ever has anything good to say about the practice of horizon-
tal price fixing. Some commentators may believe that good things can be 
said about various peripheral price-fixing practices;51 but practically no 
one ever has anything nice to say about the practice in general. 
In sum, the per se rule prohibiting horizontal price fixing has achieved 
doctrinal coherence, has not been undermined by lower courts, and ap-
pears to be singularly successful. Yet, its success can be traced only par-
tially to its attainment of Legal Process grounds. The Court has identified 
a sound policy present, and does not waffle about applying it. And yet 
the Court's failure to articulate clearly why it chose the per se path is 
troubling to the theorist; for it suggests that quality in decision-making is 
45. /d. 
46. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 109-10 n.39 (citing PHILLIP AREEDA, THE "RuLE oF REASON" 
IN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: GENERAL iSSUES 37-38 (1981)). 
47. See, e.g., Catalano, 446 U.S. at 643 (re-affinning broad application of per se rule). 
48. Trial Lawyers, 493 U.S. at 424; NCAA, 468 U.S. at 116-17; Arizona v. Maricopa 
County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 349-52 (1982); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. 
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 693-94 (1978). 
49. This is illustrated by the unaniminity which prevailed on the Court concerning 
desegregation for the seventeen years between Brown v. Board of Educ .•. 347 U.S. 483 
(1954) and Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). That una-
nimity is often thought to have been important in defusing Southern efforts to reverse or 
limit Brown. 
50. See Maricopa County, 457 U.S. at 348-54 (rejecting the rule of reason analysis 
found in Frank H. Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U. CH1. L. REv. 886 (1981). 
51. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 29, at 263-79. 
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not all that important. What is important, instead, is the absence of back-
sliding and the consensus that the Court is right. 
B. OBFUSCATION AND DEFIANCE: EIGHTY YEARS OF LESS THAN 
REASONED ELABORATION IN RESALE PRICE 
MAINTENANCE CASES 
The Supreme Court's treatment of resale price maintenance or vertical 
price fixing stands in marked contrast to its success in horizontal price 
fixing. While there are compelling reasons to maintain the per se rule 
against resale price maintenance,s2 the Court has never been able to ar-
ticulate those reasons in more than eight decades of litigation over the 
treatment of vertical price fixing. This failure is not due to a lack of abil-
ity, but, rather, to a lack of honesty. The Court's disingenuousness began 
with its first major case dealing with resale price maintenance and has 
continued to the present day. This lack of candor has continued regard-
less of whether the Court was expanding or contrasting the permissible 
behavior of manufacturers regarding the sales price of their products. 
1. Doctrinal Incoherence 
The first problem the Court confronted was the shaky foundation for 
the per se treatment of resale price maintenance. Despite its similarities 
to garden variety horizontal price fixing, a wealth of literature suggests 
that all forms of resale price maintenance are not so inevitably anticom-
petitive as to merit being treated as per se unreasonable under section 1 
of the Sherman Act.s3 
The seminal case is Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co. 54 
In Dr. Miles the Court refused to enjoin the sale of medicines by a dis-
counter who had obtained them from a distributor in violation of that 
distributor's written price maintenance contract with the plaintiff. The 
Court found the price maintenance contracts between the manufacturer 
and the distributor to be injurious to consumers, and the functional 
equivalent to a price-fixing cartel among the distributors. The Sherman 
Act only played a minor role in the decision, however, and resale price 
maintenance agreements ultimately were condemned as a violation of the 
medieval property rule against restraints against alienation. Under this 
line of thinking, a manufacturer can impose no restrictions on the distri-
bution of a product after title has passed. It was on this shaky foundation 
that a per se rule was built, explained,55 expanded to maximum resale 
52. See Robert Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters: The No-Frills Case for a Per Se 
Rule Against Vertical Price Fixing, 71 GEo. L.J. 1487 (1983). 
53. The various arguments regarding the potential pro- and anticompetitive effects of 
resale price maintenance are discussed in HERBERT HovENKAMP, FEDERAL AmTrRUST 
PoucY: THE LAw OF CoMPETITION AND ITs PRACTICE§§ 11.2-.3 (1994). 
54. 220 u.s. 373 (1911). 
55. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 47 (1960). 
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price maintenance as well,s6 and nominally maintained to the present 
day.s7 
The other main problem for the Court has always been that resale price 
maintenance by itself is not illegal. The Shennan Act only prohibits con-
tracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade.58 This is the 
basis of the Colgate doctrine that a manufacturer unilaterally can termi-
nate distributors who do not comply with the manufacturer's condition 
(including pricing) and most of the subsequent confusion in the Court's 
jurisprudence.59 Colgate may make sense when applied to cases where 
resale price maintenance jurisprudence is being used to police collusion 
by either manufacturers or retailers. The distinction between agreements 
to maintain prices and unilateral directions as to price may make sense in 
such cases.60 On the other hand, when resale price maintenance jurispru-
dence is applied for other reasons (such as the protection of small retail-
ers), distinctions between agreements to maintain prices and unilateral 
directions as to price are unimportant.6t 
Neither the per se rule nor its major limitation rests on elaborated 
grounds. The Court only made things worse by permitting the per se rule 
against resale price maintenance agreements to survive the demolition of 
the rule against restraints on alienation as a basis for antitrust liability in 
Continental TV., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.62 
Instead of directly confronting these policy weaknesses and taking an 
honest intellectual stand, the Court responded by paying lip service to 
both the per se rule and the Colgate rule but raising or lowering the re-
quirement for proof of agreement to suit its changing views about the 
harm caused by the setting of retail prices by manufacturers. Thus, cases 
like Parke Davis63 and Albrecht64 tortured the concept of an agreement 
beyond common sense in order to capture behavior that the Court felt 
was harmful to competition. To most observers, these cases appeared to 
be beyond the wording of the Sherman Act.65 
2. Modern Dishonesty 
In more recent times, the Supreme Court simply has left resale price 
maintenance in the per se illegal category, but made it impossible to 
56. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968). 
57. Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 724 {1988); Monsanto 
Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 {1984). 
· 58. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. V 1993). 
59. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919). 
60. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 53, § 11.4d. 
61. /d. 
62. 433 u.s. 36 (1977). 
63. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960). 
64. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968). 
65. The greatest intellectual honesty was shown by the Federal 'Trade Commission 
which unsuccessfully attempted to overturn Colgate or, at a minimum, establish that the 
dictation of resale prices by manufacturer, without more, could be an unfair method of 
competition in violation of § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. See In re Russell 
Stover Candies, Inc., 100 F.T.C. 1 (1982), rev'd, 718 F.2d 256 (8th Cir. 1983). 
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prove in the real world by raising the standards for proof of an actionable 
agreement,66 restricting the definition of what constitutes resale price 
maintenance agreement,67 and curtailing the standing of private parties to 
sue. 68 The most defensible of these decisions was Monsanto, in which the 
Court raised the nature of proof required to show that a price-cutting 
distributor was terminated pursuant to an agreement rather than the uni-
lateral business decision of the manufacturer. The Monsanto Court's 
holding that complaints to the manufacturer by other distributors were 
admissible, but not sufficient, to show termination by agreement rather 
than unilateral decision was defensible.69 .Unfortunately, it soon became 
part of an insurmountable hurdle for a private plaintiff bringing a per se 
resale price maintenance case under what otherwise seemed settled law. 
In Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp. 70 Justice Scalia 
accomplished the seemingly impossible task of reaffirming the per se rule 
against resale price maintenance while making it impossible to prove in 
the real world. Under Business Electronics, a terminated distributor who 
can overcome the Monsanto hurdle and establish that she was terminated 
pursuant to an agreement, must then answer the further question of 
whether she was terminated pursuant to a resale price maintenance 
agreement rather than some kind of vertical non-price agreement. 71 
The distinction is critical-but devious. If the plaintiff can establish 
that she was terminated because of a resale price maintenance agree-
ment, the case will be judged under the per se rule, greatly simplifying the 
plaintiff's task. If the plaintiff was terminated pursuant to a vertical non-
price agreement, then she normally must establish the defendant's power 
within the relevant market and that the agreement unreasonably re-
stricted competition. This distinction becomes outcome determinative in 
most dealer termination cases.n 
The Court, led by Justice Scalia, held in Business Electronics that a 
plaintiff can establish per se unreasonable resale price maintenance only 
where the defendant has agreed with another person to terminate the 
plaintiff for reasons related to price and there is some further agreement 
between the conspirators on prices or price levels.73 Proof that the plain-
tiff was terminated pursuant to some agreement between the defendants 
because she was a price cutter is not enough. The Court held that such 
agreements must be judged under the rule of reason else plaintiffs actu-
ally might win jury trials on these issues.74 
66. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984). 
67. Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 724 (1988). 
68. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328,335 (1990) (hereinaf-
ter ARCO). 
69. Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 762-63 & n.8. 
70. 485 u.s. 717 (1988). 
71. !d. at 735. 
72. See, e.g., Center Video Indus. Co. v. United Media, Inc., 995 F.2d 735 (7th Cir. 
1993). 
73. Business Elecs .. 485 U.S. at 726-27. 
74. !d. at 727-28. 
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Finally, in ARC0,75 the Court struck its cruelest blow by maintaining 
the per se illegality of all forms of resale price maintenance, but virtually 
eliminating all private causes of action on standing and antitrust injury 
grounds. The fiction of per se illegality was maintained with private 
rights of action eliminated, and enforcement was left to a largely indiffer-
ent Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission.76 
The effect of these decisions is to amend the law while claiming to up-
hold it. Assuming (heroically) that the plaintiff has standing under 
ARCO, the combined effect of Monsanto and Business Electronics de-
stroys most cases by forcing plaintiffs to prove the very type of evidence 
that is most difficult to obtain. The plaintiff always knows its own pricing 
policies, pricing policies of competing dealers are usually well known in 
the market place, and patterns of complaints about price cutting are 
equally easy to ascertain. However, Monsanto's requirement that the 
plaintiff get inside the manufacturer's head to ascertain why the decision 
to terminate occurred is hard enough. When combined with Business 
Electronics's further requirement of proof of a continuing post-termina-
tion agreement as to price, the plaintiff's task becomes almost impossible, 
given defendants' ability to manipulate pricing and invoices while under 
scrutiny from a prospective plaintiff. The lower courts have followed the 
Supreme Court's signal and have been quite aggressive in granting mo-
tions to dismiss, motions for sununary judgment, and sanctions for unsuc-
cessful resale price maintenance plaintiffs not deterred by these 
formidable hurdles.77 Although the Court has achieved stability in the 
application of the law, it has done so by avoiding doctrinal coherence. 
Legal Process does not tolerate such a raw power grab. 
3. The Irrelevance of Congress 
The effrontery to Legal Process in the Court's sneak attack on the per 
se rule against resale price maintenance is bad enough by itself. It is es-
pecially troublesome given the history of congressional approval of the 
per se rule and general disapproval of resale price maintenance. In 1975, 
Congress repealed the authority for states to enact the so-called "fair 
trade" laws, which permitted sellers to engage in resale price mainte-
75. 495 U.S. at 328. 
76. The history of government enforcement against resale price maintenance has 
waxed and waned with changes in administrations. Despite the continuing per se status of 
resale price maintenance, there has been no criminal grand jury investigation in this area 
since the Cuisinarts investigation, which was resolved through a civil consent decree in the 
early 1980s. United States v. Cuisinarts, Inc., 46 Fed. Reg. 3665 (1981) (Proposed Final 
Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement). Civil enforcement actions against resale 
price maintenance halted during the Reagan administration and have been used only spo-
radically since then. There probably is no one currently at either the Antitrust Division or 
the Federal Trade Commission who has ever worked on a government maximum resale 
price maintenance case, which is the only viable option after the ARCO opinion. 
77. See, e.g., Center Video Indus. Co. v. United Media, Inc., 995 F.2d 735 (7th Cir. 
1993). 
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nance.78 That repeal, done against the background of the long existing 
per se rule dating back to Dr. Miles, represents congressional condemna-
tion of resale price maintenance as a practice.79 Similarly, a later Con-
gress expressed the same sentiments when it adopted resolutions cutting-
off all funding for Reagan Antitrust Division attempts to eliminate the 
per se rule in this area.80 The Congress, our primary maker of policy, has 
thus made quite clear its preference for a strong stand against resale price 
maintenance. 
The Court, however, has ignored that preference. The Court's history 
of clever writing to obscure, rather than illuminate its own policy prefer-
ences, is precisely the opposite of the reasoned elaboration called for by 
Hart and Sacks.s1 The deliberate choice to dissemble leaves a body of 
antitrust doctrine flawed from the beginning and in need of both consis-
tency and fidelity to congressional policy preferences. 
C. SuccEss BY DEFAULT AND DEsPAIR: MoNOPOLIZATION 
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence concerning monopolization also 
has been less than successful.82 Part of the problem has been the promul-
gation of high-sounding but vague standards. Another part of the prob-
lem has been a disgraceful refusal by the Court to touch this vital area for 
decades at a stretch.83 A final part of the problem stems from the tension 
between a populist hatred of "monopoly" and marketplace realities. 
1. Doctrinal Incoherence 
Modern monopoly law begins with Learned Hand's opinion in the Al-
coa case,84 an opinion unfortunately "riddled with internal inconsisten-
cies. "85 Moreover, the opinion suffers from bizarre product market 
definitions and it condemned conduct-expanding capacity to meet de-
mands-which was not only sound business but good for consumers and 
the economy. Alcoa, in short, produced bad writing, bad economics, and 
78. Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, 89 Stat. 801 (1975), amending 15 U.S.C. 
§§ I , 45(a). 
79. HovENKAMP, supra note 53, § 11.1. See also Hearings on S. 408 Before the Sub-
comm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 94th Con g., 1 Sess. 
(1975). Even the Sylvania Court, in eliminating per se rules for vertical nonprice restraints, 
acknowledged congressional approval for continued per se analysis of vertical price re-
straints. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. , 433 U.S. 36, 51 n.18 (1977). 
80. See White House Opposes Authorization of Justice Department with RPM Rider, 52 
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 1127, 1127 (1987). 
81. HART & SACKS, supra note 30. 
82. " Attempt to monopolize" is also a Sherman Act offense. For many years, the law 
in this area was a hopeless mess. but it has been clarified recently by making it a part of the 
general law of monopolization. Thus, liability for attempted monopolization requires both 
a specific intent to monopolize as well as a "dangerous probability of success." Spectrum 
Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 113 S. Ct. 884, 892 (1993). 
83. See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 444 U.S. 1093 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (expressing exasperation at his Brethen's willingness 
to "let this cup pass from us .... " ld. at 1094). 
84. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
85. Ross, supra note .W, at 26. 
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bad law.86 The opinion seemed tailor-made to condemn Alcoa.s7 As 
such, it did little to give credibility to the law of monopolization.ss 
The Supreme Court, after flirting with a per se rule to condemn mo-
nopolies,89 finally adopted a version of the Alcoa test in the Grinnell 
case:90 
The offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two ele-
ments: {1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market 
and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distin-
guished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior 
product, business acumen, or historic accident.91 
This hardly improved things. Generations of law students have wres-
tled with questions like the following: Why wasn't the building of new 
plants by Alcoa to meet increasing demands an example of business fore-
sight? If one of two competitors' plants is destroyed in an earthquake 
and the survivor had refused to build on that spot, has the survivor had its 
monopoly position thrust upon it? And so forth. 
The incoherence of the Grinnell test was exacerbated by the impor-
tance of defining the relevant product and geographic product markets. 
This task seemed beset in this area (as well as in that of mergers) by jury-
rigged market definitions designed to help absolve or condemn particular 
activity.92 At least with market definitions, the Court has provided gui-
dance in a large number of opinions dealing with merger law. Monopoli-
zation, however, was left untouched for nearly three decades following 
the Grinnell decision. 
2. Guerrilla Warfare 
That lacuna has proven most unfortunate, for the Grinnell standard 
contributed little to efficient resolution of monopolization complaints. In 
hostile hands, the standard formulation proved an apt tool for judges 
prone to exercise populist predilections.93 That exercise unfortunately 
also cramped efforts by dominant firms to behave competitively. Even an 
expansion of capacity to meet demands, as Alcoa illustrated, could have 
disastrous consequences. 
86. It is no wonder that Gerald Gunther does not even mention Alcoa in his recent 
biography of Learned Hand. GERAt..D GuNTiiER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND TiiE 
JUDGE (1994). 
f57. Judge Wyzanski later wrote that Hand probably was "cabined by the findings" of 
the trial court, apparently suggesting that Hand contrived his opinion to get around incon-
venient facts found below. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 
295,341 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (per curiam). If so, Hand was not only 
acting unprofessionally, he was not doing the Jaw any favors. 
88. Although a circuit court decision, Alcoa has always been treated as a primary pre-
cedent and its test later was approved by the Supreme Court in American Tobacco Co. v. 
United States, 328 U.S. 781,811-14 (1946). 
89. E.g., United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948). 
90. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966). 
91. /d. at 570-71. 
92. Alcoa and Grinnell were particularly egregious examples of this practice. 
93. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946). 
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The void was filled by commentators94 and, somewhat reluctantly, by 
lower courts.95 Like guerrillas wagirig an ultimately victorious war, the 
lower courts began by testing the edges of the Grinnell doctrine. As the 
Supreme Court avoided contact with the guerrillas (by refusing to grant 
certiorari), the lower courts became more ambitious and replaced Grin-
nell with far more sophisticated tests.% 
The Supreme Court finally returned to the merits of section 2 in 1985 in 
the Aspen case.97 In Aspen the Court chose a particularly peculiar factual 
setting to make modem sense of Grinnell. There are four ski mountains 
in the Aspen ski area. Originally, all four mountains were independently 
owned, but their operators cooperated in offering a very popular series of 
joint lift tickets.98 Eventually, the three most desirable mountains fell 
under common control. The dominant ski operator then imposed pro-
gressively more onerous terms on its joint venture partner and finally ter-
minated the arrangement. Skilled plaintiff's counsel obtained a $7.5 
million verdict that the defendant had "monopolized the market for 
downhill skiing services in Aspen, Colorado."99 The Supreme Court 
agreed and upheld the jury verdict. Discussion of Grinnell is relegated to 
a footnote.10o Instead, Justice Stevens's opinion focuses on: "whether 
the challenged conduct is fairly characterized as 'exclusionary' or 'an-
ticompetitive'-to use the words in the trial court's instructions-or 
'predatory,' to use a word that scholars seem to favor. "lOt 
The Court then suggested that a defendant would not be liable under 
section 2 if there were "valid" or "normal" business reasons for its behav-
ior.l02 The key to distinguishing predation from hard competition in 
Aspen itself was the defendant's willingness to forego short term profits 
"because it was more interested in reducing competition .. . over the long 
run by harming its smaller competition."103 
94. See, e.g., 3 PHILLIP AREEDA & DoNALD F. TuRNER, ANTITRUST LAw 'I 626 et seq. 
(1978). 
95. See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), 
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980); Sargent-Welch Scientific Co. v. Ventron Corp., 567 F.2d 
701 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1978). 
96. See, e.g., Dimmitt Agri Indus., Inc. v. CPC lnt'l Inc., 679 F .2d 516 {5th Cir. 1982), 
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1082 (1983). 
97. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985). 
98. In comments befitting a hotel concierge, the Court noted: "Most experienced ski-
ers quite logically prefer to purchase their tickets at once for the whole period that they 
will spend at the resort; they can then spend more time on the slopes and enjoying the 
apres-ski amenities ... " /d . at 605. 
99. /d. at 587. The question of whether there is a relevant market for skiing limited to 
Aspen, Colorado should have been a significant issue in the litigation. For unexplained 
reasons, the defendant never challenged the jury's findings that it had monopoly power in 
this "market." /d. at 596 & n.20. 
100. /d. at 596 n.19. 
101. Aspen, 472 U.S. at 602. 
102. /d. at 604-05, 608. In Aspen the jury found that the defendant did not have a valid 
business justification for its behavior. There was sufficient evidence to support this conclu-
sion, and hence the verdict was affirmed. 
103. /d. at 608; see also id. at 610-11. 
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Aspen raises two Legal Process type questions. Did it change the law? 
And, what difference does it make? 
The authors of this paper and the lower courts are split over whether 
Aspen represents a fundamental change in the law of monopolization or 
is merely an application of Grinnell to a bizarre fact pattern not likely to 
recur outside the world of ski resorts of the rich and famous.104 
Our best guess is that Justice Stevens sought to rationalize and modern-
ize the law of monopolization. If Aspen was intended as a narrow appli-
cation of existing law to a peculiar set of facts, then the Court had three 
easy options. First, it could simply have denied certiorari since it ulti-
mately affirmed the decision of the jury, the district court, and the Tenth 
Circuit. Second, the Court could have affirmed on the more narrow "es-
sential facilities" grounds used by the Tenth Circuit. Finally, if Aspen is 
just the latest entry in a long line of Grinnell cases, the Court could have 
said so, and saved itself a lot of heavy analytical lifting. 
It seems, therefore, that Aspen represents a new test for monopoliza-
tion. However, this test also fails to satisfy the demands of reasoned elab-
oration. The search for a "valid business justification" is no more 
content-filled than Grinnell's "willful acquisition or maintenance" 
formula.105 The problem, of course, is that the kind of intent and conduct 
that amounts to healthy hard competition is virtually indistinguishable 
from unlawful predatory monopolization. 
The result of fifty-plus years of Alcoa, Grinnell, and Aspen has been 
the virtual abandonment of monopolization litigation by the government. 
No private section 2 case raises the serious prospect of divestiture or 
structural relief. Monopolization and attempted monopolization is alive 
and well in private treble damage litigation, but only as part of a general 
panoply of business tort remedies. What is forever gone as a result of the 
Court's ongoing failures is section 2 as the serious public policy tool that 
Congress intended. 
Has the Supreme Court's lack of leadership harmed anyone? Quite 
clearly it has. First, by using easily manipulated tests, the Court has de-
terred significant amounts of legitimate conduct. Second, the lower 
courts may have straightened things out but it took a long time to do so, a 
process that only exacerbated the problem of doctrinal incoherence. 
Third, in the absence of guidance from above, a variety of doctrines are 
104. Some circuit courts attempt to analyze valid business purpose while others merely 
string-cite Grinnell and Aspen together. Compare Universal Analytics, Inc. v. MacNeai-
Schwendler Corp., 914 F.2d 1256, 1258 (9th Cir. 1990) with Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. 
Western Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 377 (7th Cir. 1986). 
105. A useful analytic approach would examine the defendant's willingness to sacrifice 
short-term profits to achieve long-term benefits at the expense of a rival. That test is not 
yet being rigorously applied by the lower courts. The focus is more typically on whether 
the jury's determination as to "intent" to monopolize is defensible. See, e.g., Illinois v. 
Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 935 F.2d 1469, 1481-82 (7th Cir. 1991). 
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beginning to percolate among the lower courts, 106 a bad situation in a 
national economy. 
D. FAILURE BY OvER-BROAD DocrRINEs LAcKING PoucY BAsEs 
The areas of group boycotts and tie-ins have proven serious failures 
despite the intuitive appeal of the basic law. This failure can be traced to 
the Supreme Court's declaration of a broad rule supported only by the 
most cursory of policy justification. When lower courts refused to adhere 
to the extreme implications of the stated law, the Court refused to adjust 
to doctrine. The result is doctrinal shambles. 
1. Group Boycotts 
Joint efforts to deny a competitor access to goods or services (group 
boycott) are said to be per se illegal. Children should not be permitted to 
see this area of the law. Doctrinal wallowing, massive resistance by the 
lower courts, and scholarly confusion dominate the field . 
The Court announced the per se rule in Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale 
Stores, Inc. 107 Because the Court enunciated a per se rule for any con-
certed refusal to deal with no apparent limit either in the facts of Klor's 
or its analysis, an allegation of group boycott soon became a favorite 
weapon in every plaintiff's arsenal. 
Since Klor's, the Court has spoken with many tongues on the subject of 
group boycotts. In General Motors the Court condemned per sea classic 
group boycott by car dealers to punish a price-cutting competitor by elim-
inating its source of supply.108 The Court refused to apply the per se 
label in Indiana Federation of Dentists,109 but nonetheless quickly con-
demned an arrangement to jointly refuse to supply dental x-rays and 
other information to insurance providers.uo 
In Northwest Stationers111 the Court appeared to speak more clearly in 
refusing to condemn per se a cooperative arrangement whereby smaller 
sellers of stationary supplies pooled their resources to purchase merchan-
dise jointly at better prices and create their own cooperative warehouse. 
A much larger competitor, expelled for failure to adhere to cooperative 
106. The post-Aspen decisions on § 2 are collected in SEcnON OF ANTITRUST LAw, 
AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS (THIRD) 219-26 (Willard K. Tom 
et al. eds., 1992) and the ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS ANNUAL REVIEW SERIES. 
107. 359 U.S. 207 (1959). The opinion was written by Justice Black. Klor's alleged that 
Broadway-Hale had enlisted appliance manufacturers in a boycott of Klor's. Because 
Klor's was said to have "hundreds" of competitors in the area. later courts and commenta-
tors have struggled to find some rationale for the boycott. It is best to remember that the 
boycott was only alleged, and that the procedural posture of the case was that the defend-
ant had been granted a summary judgment. The alleged boycott, in short, is difficult to 
credit unless Klor's was a notorious price-cutter undermining an illegal resale price mainte-
nance scheme. No evidence, however, supports that supposition. 
108. United States v. General Motors Corp .• 384 U.S. 127, 146 (1966). 
109. FrC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986). 
110. !d. at 459-65. 
111. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 
284 (1985). 
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rules, sued and alleged that it was the victim of a per se unreasonable 
group boycott and refusal to deal. The Court, for the first time, sought to 
distinguish among the many types of boycotts and concerted refusals to 
do business. The Court also attempted to bring group boycotts back into 
the general framework of the rule of reason governing all of section 1 and 
the limited application of per se rules to those agreements between com-
petitors which were inevitably and unreasonably anticompetitive. 
The Court did not question the use of per se rules in those situations 
where the boycott was designed to deny a competitor a source of sup-
ply,l12 especially if the boycotting firms possess the power to enforce 
their boycotts effectively.11 3 However, the Court also stated: 
Although a concerted refusal to deal need not necessarily possess all 
of these traits to merit per se treatment, not every cooperative activ-
ity involving a restraint or exclusion will share with the per se forbid-
den boycotts the likelihood of predominately anticompetitive 
consequences.114 
The message of Northwest Stationers then appears to be that there are 
group boycotts and there are group boycotts. How to distinguish the two 
is left largely unresolved. At least, Northwest Stationers represented a 
clear signal to the lower courts that some effort must be made to deter-
mine whether a concerted refusal to deal was facially anticompetitive in 
nature prior to per se condemnation. That signal was muddied and un-
dercut by FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n.115 In Trial Lawyers 
a group boycott of the District of Columbia criminal justice system by 
court appointed lawyers seeking higher hourly wages was condemned per 
se without the more discriminating language of Northwest Stationers. 
Against this background, the lower courts simply have rebelled. Most 
lower courts continue to characterize group boycotts as per se unlawful 
but have developed a series of different strategies to avoid actually apply-
ing the per se rule to the cases before them. Some of these courts limit 
the per se rule to so-called "classic" group boycotts initiated to harm a 
competitor.116 Some limit the rule to those boycotts aimed at enforcing 
price-fixing agreements or other independently illegal objectives.117 
Others seized upon the language in Northwest Stationers to create a hy-
brid test where the per se rule is only applied to group boycotts following 
proof of the defendants' power in a relevant market.118 Still other courts 
manipulate the standards for distinguishing between a concerted refusal 
112. General Motors, 384 U.S. at 127. 
113. Northwest Stationers, 472 U.S. at 293-94. Northwest Stationers thus can be read as 
either affirming or reven;ing the per se rule as it was applied in Klor's. 
114. ld. at 295. 
115. 493 u.s. 411 (1990). 
116. See, e.g., Flegel v. Christian Hosp., 4 F.3d 682, 687 (8th Cir. 1993); U.S. Healthcare, 
Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 593 {lst Cir. 1993); Coffey v. Health trust, Inc., 955 
F.2d 1388 (lOth Cir. 1992); Seagood Trading Corp. v. Jerrico, Inc., 924 F.2d 1555 (11th Cir. 
1991). 
117. See, e.g., Collins v. Associated Pathologists, Ltd., 844 F.2d 473, 479 (7th Cir. 1988). 
118. See, e.g., Lie v. St. Joseph, 964 F.2d 567, 570 {6th Cir. 1992). 
to deal and a series of lawful unilateral decisions by firms acting in their 
own rational self interest.119 Finally, a growing number of courts simply 
abandon the per se rule, despite its continued favor in the Supreme 
Court, and require an analysis of the purpose and effect of the boycott in 
keeping with the teachings of the traditional rule of reason analysis.120 
These more adventurous lower courts either think they can read the tea 
leaves regarding the next Supreme Court pronouncement or place their 
faith in the Court's recent unwillingness to grant certiorari in antitrust 
cases.121 
2. The Vanishing Per Se Rule: Tying Arrangements 
A manufacturer of widgets who requires that every widget buyer also 
buy its gadgets from the widget manufacturer is said to have tied the sale 
of gadgets to the sale of widgets. lYing agreements have been held sub-
ject to a per se rule,122 subject to a series of conditions: that two products 
be involved, that the defendant have substantial market power over the 
tying product, and that the agreement affect "a not insubstantial amount 
of commerce."123 
The Court's jurisprudence in this area parallels its group boycott analy-
sis. An overly broad rule, poorly thought out and defended, was sub-
jected to scathing academic criticism, undermined by guerrilla warfare in 
the lower courts, and finally modified in two doctrinally incoherent 
opinions. 
Classical tying doctrine suffered from two basic flaws: it covered too 
much territory and it made no sense. The first defect was easy to see: 
How do you know when you have two products, for example? When a 
car company sells a car with its own radio inside, is it selling a product or 
is it tying the sale of the radio to the sale of the car? The answers to these 
questions could not be found in the stated policy underlying the rule.124 
119. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984); Precision 
Piping & Instruments, Inc. v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 951 F.2d 613 (4th Cir. 1991). 
120. See, e.g., Wigod v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 981 F.2d 1510, 1517 (7th Cir. 1992); 
Tarabishi v. McAlester Regional Hosp .• 951 F.2d 1558, 1570 (lOth Cir. 1991), cere. denied, 
112 S. Ct. 2996 (1992); Oksanen v. Page Memorial Hosp .• 945 F.2d 696 (4th Cir. 1991), cere. 
denied, 502 U.S. 1074 (1992). 
121. A legal realist would be more inclined to see the torture of the per se rule for 
group boycotts in the lower courts as the result of the tremendous pressures put on the 
legal system by the ongoing changes to the nation's health care system and the generation 
of many hundreds of hospital staff privilege cases that the federal courts are reluctant to 
characterize as per se unlawful group boycotts with the attendant treble damages and at-
torneys fees. 
122. Tying arrangements may be tested under either§ 1 of the Sherman Act, or§ 3 of 
the Clayton Act. The test is the same. 
123. The per se rule in this area is usually associated with International Salt Co. v. 
United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). 
124. Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969) (Fortner f) 
represented the high water mark of this absurdity. The Court there held that when U.S. 
Steel extended credit to a buyer of its mobile homes it was tying the sale of the homes to 
the sale of its credit. /d. at 509. Only misguided (and unstated) populism could explain 
such a stupid holding. 
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Indeed, it was not until the past decade that the Court began to grapple 
with these definitional problems. 
A more fundamental flaw lay in the lack of doctrinal support of the per 
se rule. Not all ties are bad. Some can even be pro-competitive, as the 
lower courts recognized early on. A tie becomes anticompetitive when it 
threatens to create or entrench a firm's dominant market position or is 
used to evade price regulation. The per se rule, however, condemned all 
ties-good, bad, or indifferent.12S Naturally, this led lower courts, eager 
to avoid injustice, to create exceptions to the per se rule.126 
Unfortunately, Supreme Court doctrine took no notice either of hostile 
commentary or rebellion in the lower courts. Even though Justice Ste-
vens tried to instill some economic rigor into his Brethren in Fortner II, 127 
the task seemed hopeless, given the Court's sorry earlier history in this 
area.t28 
A decade later, in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde,129 
the Court once again dropped the ball. At issue in Hyde was the defend-
ant hospital's contract with a group of anesthesiologists to provide exclu-
sive services. The Court treated what was obviously an exclusive dealing 
case as a tying arrangement, and the majority barely rejected an effort to 
remove ties from the area of per se illegality.130 The majority, however, 
did not take the opportunity to elaborate the law in a reasoned way. 
Rather, the court announced a new test: Did defendants use this market 
power to "force" consumers to buy an unwanted product.131 
This inquiry, unfortunately, is about as easy to use as a set of gossamer 
wings.t32 Exactly when does a defendant have enough power, for exam-
ple, to "force" a defendant to accept the tie? Imprecise as the Hyde deci-
sion might have been, however, at least it had the virtue of relating stated 
125. The per se rule against tying was the subject of the first rigorous economic attack 
against the Court's antitrust decisions. It later became commonplace to assert that the only 
evil associated with ties was the extension of power from one market to another. More 
recently, sophisticated defenses of tie-in illegality have been warranted. See HoVENKAMP, 
supra note 53, at 370-81 (discussing literature). 
126. See, e.g., United States v. Jerrold Elects. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), 
aff'd, 365 U.S. 567 {1961) (per curiam) {holding that "bundling" of products justified to get 
new industry started); Principe v. McDonald's Corp., 631 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. 
denied, 451 U.S. 970 (1981) (holding that if a tie is successful, it is not illegal). 
127. United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977). 
128. See Victor H. Kramer, The Supreme Court and Tying Arrangements: Antitrust As 
History, 69 MINN. L. REv. 1013, 1047-49 (1985) (observing that much of the trouble with 
Fortner II could be traced to the fact that the Court did not affinn the summary judgment 
for the defendants in Fortner 1). The Fortner litigation took fifteen years to resolve. The 
trial court was reversed three times during that period, suggesting how ridiculous the law 
of tie-ins had become. See id. at 1064-65. 
129. 466 U.S. 2 (1984). 
130. 1\vo Justices voted for the majority on the grounds that Congress had ratified the 
Court's prior construction of the Act by not amending that area of the Act. /d. at 32. 
Justice O'Connor, concurring, treated the question as one of exclusive dealing. /d. at 32· 
47. 
131. /d. at 18. 
132. See E . THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST 
AND ITS EcoNOMIC IMPLICATIONS 192 (2d ed. 1994). 
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doctrine to the only known evil of tying arrangements-the "leveraging" 
of power from one market to another. 
The same cannot be said for the Court's most recent entry into the 
field, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc. l33 This rather 
complex case involved a requirement by Kodak that it would sell replace-
ment parts for its copiers only to those who either repaired their own 
machines or had Kodak service them. The opinion is decidedly, and per-
haps deliberately, obscure. It can be read as a rebuke to a trial judge for 
granting summary judgment too quickly, or it can be read as holding that 
market imperfections (such as information costs) require a case-by-case 
analysis of when "forcing" takes place.134 In any event, Kodak does noth-
ing to restore coherence to the field of ties. 
As was the case with boycotts, the Court's recent efforts to deal with 
tying arrangements have tried, unsuccessfully, to restore some order. Its 
failure can be attributed largely to a lack of intellectual honesty, this time 
by those seeking to maintain a per se rule against tying. 
Nominally, the fight centers on the determination as to when tying is 
per se unreasonable. However, because proof of substantial market 
power is an element of a per se tying violation, this invokes most of the 
costs, and none of the benefits, of the full rule of reason. 135 Conversely, a 
plaintiff can always seek to prove unlawful tying under the rule of reason. 
However, if the plaintiff cannot prove sufficient power to invoke the per 
se rule, how can she win under the rule of reason? The best argument 
that advocates of the current rule have mustered is that it is too late to 
change the law in this area.136 The time has come for the Court to make 
a better reasoned stand or else change the status quo. 
E. INSTITUTIONAL FAILURE: HoRIZONTAL MERGERS 
Mergers between competing companies, horizontal mergers, are gov-
erned by the 1950 amendment to section 7 of the Clayton Act.137 The 
Court's jurisprudence under section 7 has fluctuated wildly. This oscilla-
tion is somewhat surprising given a rough consensus as to the goal to be 
achieved by section 7. 
1. Doctrinal Incoherence 
A major part of the problem lays with the Court. Its decisions have 
been, in a word, lousy.t3s Beginning with Brown Shoe139 and continuing 
133. 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992). 
134. See Stephen Calkins, Supreme Court Antitrust 1991-92: The Revenge of the Amici, 
61 ANTITRUST L.J. 269 (1993). 
135. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 34 (1984) (O'Connor, J., 
concurring). 
136. 1d. at 32 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
137. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988). Section 7 is often referred to as the Celler-Kefauver Act. 
138. See United States v. Von's Grocery, Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966). 
139. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). 
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through such disasters as Philadelphia National Bankt40 and Von's Gro-
cery, 141 the decisions provided little guidance and less doctrinal coher-
ence. As Justice Stewart's dissent in Von's Grocery suggested, "[t]he sole 
consistency I can find is that in litigation under § 7, the Government al-
ways wins."142 And while many commentators have praised the Philadel-
phia National Bank test requiring a change of "qualitative substantiality" 
to void a merger under section 7, even that test is fundamentally flawed. 
The truth of the matter is that the judicial system lacks institutional 
competence to resolve either the political or theoretical problems 
presented by most horizontal mergers. Phrases like "qualitative substan-
tiality" may sound good but they provide little guidance-other than to 
eliminate the de minimis merger on the one hand and to include the 
merger that creates a near-monopoly on the other. 
"Qualitative substantiality" really is a jury instruction. In other words, 
if the merger is neither tiny nor great the court has great discretion in 
making its decision. When a case will fall within that range, however, is 
difficult to predict. Thus, it fails to provide both industry and government 
with adequate guidance as to whether a particular merger is vulnerable 
under section 7. Although it is certain that the Court could have been 
more forthright in its explanations, it is hard to imagine a standard that 
would have given the requisite guidance and, at the same time, captured 
the nuances of the many factors that might be considered in approving a 
merger. 
To express all of this somewhat less elegantly, merger law ain't easy. 
Consider some of the factors that might be considered: market concentra-
tion and trends; ease of entry; potential efficiencies; national security; for-
eign competition; failing firms and industries. Many, perhaps all, of these 
factors are subject to intense debate concerning their analytic value and 
application. Resolution of these indefinite and inchoate matters require 
what Lon Fuller styled "polycentric" decisions, decisions that courts are 
ill-equipped to make.143 Courts function best, Fuller suggested, when 
they make "yes-no" decisions-such as whether the defendant was driv-
ing negligently. They are far less capable to answer questions such as 
whether a school system needs more money at the expense of, say, health 
care. Questions of this type are inherently political and should be de-
cided by the political branches of government. 
The Supreme Court has remained silent about the substantive interpre-
tation of section 7 of the Clayton Act since the General Dynamics144 case 
140. The reception of these opinions was not aided by the even more disastrous opin-
ions issued by the Court in the 1960s and 1970s on vertical and conglomerate mergers. 
141. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). 
142. Von's Grocery, 384 U.S. at 301 (Stewart, J. , dissenting). 
143. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353 
{1978). 
144. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974). 
in 1974. The Court has been content for two decades to nibble at smaller 
issues relating to standing and the like.145 
2. Administrative Coherence 
As a result of the Court's past inability to bring coherence to the field 
of merger law and policy and its current silence, other actors have 
stepped in to dominate the field. The center of gravity has shifted from 
the courts to the enforcement agencies.t46 Merger and acquisition work 
from the antitrust side has become more about lobbying the Antitrust 
Division and the Federal Trade Commission (and state attorneys general) 
not to challenge a proposed deal and almost nothing about the litigation 
of contested mergers in the courts. 
This change was inevitable for a variety of reasons-in addition to the 
inability of the courts to coherently define legal standards and consist-
ently apply them in litigation. Ftrst, Congress increased the focus on the 
enforcement agencies in passing the 1976 Hart-Scott-Rodino Act requir-
ing premerger notification for most substantial acquisitions.147 Second, 
restrictions on standing and antitrust injury148 made governmental chal-
lenge the only real effective deterrent to anticompetitive mergers. Third, 
the Antitrust Division, later joined by the Federal Trade Commission, be-
gan issuing and refining a series of Merger Guidelines which replaced the 
case law as the applicable standards for counselors. Finally, both agencies 
adopted a policy of negotiation and a willingness to refrain from challeng-
ing an acquisition based on the binding commitment of the parties to 
restructure the deal or make limited spinoffs within a defined time frame. 
All of these changes have resulted in a system where the death knell 
for a proposed merger is neither the decision of a court nor even the 
decision of the agencies, i.e., to challenge the merger in court. Instead, 
the key decision is whether the agencies will make a second request for 
additional information; that request prevents the parties from consum-
mating any reportable transaction until there is a complete response to 
the agency's often voluminous request.149 While part of this trend is inev-
itable given the need for certainty and speed in business transactions, a 
large part of the growth of the administrative merger state appears to be 
the direct product of the failure and then abdication of the Supreme 
Court to create a coherent body of merger law enforceable in the courts. 
145. See, e.g., California v. American Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271 (1990); Cargill, Inc. v. 
Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986). 
146. See Richard M. Steuer, Counseling Without Case Law, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 823 
(1995). 
147. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
148. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986); Brunswick Corp. v. 
Pueblo Bowi-0-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977). 
149. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(e) (1988). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
(Vol. 48. 
The Supreme Court used to speak quite regularly on matters of great 
importance to Antitrust. The Court has preferred in recent years, how-
ever, to address the marginalia of Antitrust, and in the past few years has 
remained completely silent. Antitrust as a common law discipline needs 
an active Supreme Court to guide and shape a field and body of doctrine 
that sits at the intersection of law, politics, and economics. The effect of 
the Court's recent silence only highlights its past successes and failures. 
Rules against horizontal price fixing are clear and easy to follow with 
swift and certain consequences for their willful violation. It is ironic that 
the Court remains the most active in the area where it is least necessary 
and where there is the greatest danger of blurring the rules that have 
governed antitrust for most of its modem era. 
The Court remains silent in the areas where it could do the most good. 
Areas like mergers, resale price maintenance, refusals to deal, and tying 
cry out for reasoned elaboration, honest disclosure of policy preferences, 
and deference to clearly expressed congressional policy. The failure to do 
so leaves lower courts as the battlegrounds for litigants and invites gov-
ernment bureaucrats to occupy the field through their enforcement deci-
sions. Clear and honest opinions are needed for antitrust laws to succeed 
in these areas to distinguish between desirable and anticompetitive mar-
ket behavior. However, if the Legal Process approach to jurisprudence 
teaches us anything, it is that the Supreme Court has a unique duty to 
speak clearly and forthrightly. If it cannot or will not do that, perhaps 
silence is golden. 
